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On Fragmentation and Scientiﬁc Progress
1 Introduction
Why are the social sciences so fragmented as compared to the natural sciences, for example physics or
biology? What consequences has fragmentation for the overall progress of a ﬁeld?
The focus of this work is the question why disciplinary fragmentation and scientiﬁc progress are
correlated. Potential explanations are abound. First, there might be a direct causal relationship between
fragmentation and scientiﬁc progress. For instance, it could be that the natural sciences are less fragmented
into opposing schools because they have developed a scientiﬁc consensus very early in their history (Cole,
2001, Chap. 6). Likewise, a high degree of fragmentation might slow down scientiﬁc progress, because it
hampers the diﬀusion of ideas and insights (Cole, 2001, Chap. 6). Second, fragmentation and progress
might not inﬂuence each other, but there might be third variables that aﬀect both outcomes. These factors
might be rooted in the nature of the disciplines. For instance, many concepts of social scientiﬁc theories
are diﬃcult to deﬁne, leading to disagreement about their appropriate interpretation and measurement
(Cole, 2001, Chap. 1). Unclear deﬁnitions of concepts also slow down the process of scientiﬁc discovery.
Furthermore, institutional factors might aﬀect the degree of fragmentation and progress in the diﬀerent
disciplines (Cole, 2001, Chap. 14). For instance, scarcity in public funding does not only slow down
progress but might also further increase competition between scientist and hamper the willingness to
interact with competing research teams, which in turn fosters the formation of distinct clusters.
2 Model Speciﬁcation
We assume a population of N = 100 scientists exploring a continuous epistemic space under the eﬀect of
social inﬂuence of related opinions. The position ?xi(t) that scientist i occupies in the epistemic space at
time t represents his or her current view. At time t+ 1, scientist i can either update or not his position.
Such a movement in space then represents the theoretical approach that the agent follows in his or her
investigation. We specify the exploration of the epistemic landscape by the scientist in search for the













The exploration velocity term is speciﬁed as in Vicsek et al. (1995) model for collective motion of
self-propelled particles:
?vi(t+ 1) = α?vi(t) + (1− α)??vj(t)?R , (2)
where 0 < α ≤ 1 and ?.?R means an averaging over all scientists within the radius R. This speciﬁcation
of the exploration speed reﬂects the desire to produce scientiﬁc progress along with one’s peers, but also
some persistence in the research path taken.
However, unlike the original Vicsek’s model, the velocity is not a constant, but varies over time. In
fact, each scientist is initially assigned a velocity ?vi(t0) drawn from a uniform random distribution. The
averaging over neighbors eventually produces an alignment of the velocities vectors of both components
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of Eq. 2, e.g. the direction and the strength of the vector. Given that agents that meets at a certain
position can follow completely antithetical approaches, the size of the velocity vector is usually reduced
by the averaging procedure. This represents frictional eﬀects in social interactions.
The convergence term ?Ch(t) reﬂects the attraction to the ground truth. As mentioned also by Hegsel-
mann and Krause (2006), it is not to be interpreted literally, but rather as the feedback that individuals
receive from the results of their experiments and continued investigation. The force is suppose to give a
weak hint regarding the research direction to follow, but never the exact answer, because otherwise every
individual could jump directly to the true value, and this is simply not how scientiﬁc research typically





where ?xh − ?xi(t) is the distance between the agent’s position and the location of the ground truth,
and τh is a parameter representing the strength of the attractive force. It implies that initially, when still
far away from the ground truth, scientists receive a clear signal of the research direction they should take
to approach the truth. However, the closer they get to the true value, the harder it gets to actually make
progress.
The noise term ?ξi(t) plays a crucial role in our model in a twofold manner. On the one side, we assume
(i) Gaussian position noise on the approach hold by a scientist at time t, and on the other (ii) we assume
Gaussian angular noise on the research direction followed by each individual scientist at time t+ 1. The
position noise, whose standard deviation is denoted by ?, acts as white noise, while the angular noise,
whose standard deviation is denoted by σ, introduces stocasticity and path dependence in the trajectory
followed by the scientist. The former can be interpreted as an measurement error, which can be reduced
but never completely eliminated. The latter can instead be interpreted as the inevitable diﬀerence between
planned and actual research path, or as well as the degree to which a scientist is voluntarily ready deviate
from the approach of his or her peers, if he or she is making research in a group.
Figure 1: Ideal typical run showing diﬀerent patterns of consensus and level of scientiﬁc progress at
four time steps: 1, 200, 1000, 2000. The ﬁgure shows the emergence of diﬀerent schools of thought, that
gradually merge together in proximity of the truth.
3 Preliminary Results
We devised the following computational experiment. At the beginning of each simulation we have ran-
domly preassigned agents to n = (1, . . . , 30) clusters. Each group of agents was then placed on a radius of
0.4 units away from truth, and equidistant from neighboring groups. Afterward, we have then measured
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the time necessary to achieve a stable consensus on truth, deﬁned as 75% of the agents within a radius
of 0.05 units from truth. The results are shown in Fig. 2 A. Unequivocally, we observe two diﬀerent
consensus regimes, determined by the value of the interaction radius R. In the case of small R, there
is a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the number of clusters and the time necessary for reaching
consensus. In the case of large R, the number of cluster has a very limited eﬀect. Surprisingly, however,
the coeﬃcient even takes the opposite sign: the more clusters the faster the consensus is built up. The
results from the linear regression of time to consensus over initial number of clusters are shown in Table
1.
We then investigated, the eﬀect of the other social inﬂuence variable of our model, i.e. the strength of
social inﬂuence α. In case of a large radius R, as expected, manipulating α played no major role. However,
in case of a small radius R, the results are striking. When social inﬂuence is very strong (α = 0.01), the R2
value of the regression is 0.51. On the contrary, if social inﬂuence is very weak (α = 0.99), no simulation
reached consensus within 20.000 iterations!
Figure 2: At the beginning of the simulation agents were randomly preassigned to n = (1, . . . , 30) clusters.
Each group of agent was then placed on a radius of 0.4 units away from truth, and equidistant from their
neighboring groups. The graph shows the time necessary to 75% of the agents to end up in a radius of
0.05 units from truth. Clusters are a hurdle to consensus if and only if the interaction radius is small.
On top of this, if also social inﬂuence is also weak, e.g. α = 0.99, reaching the truth can be extremely
unlikely.
Clustering per se is not a factor that slows down scientiﬁc progress. It is rather the nature of social
interactions that completely determines how consensus is built up and how long it takes to reach the
ground truth. A small interaction radius, and highly individualistic agents represent the worst environ-
mental conditions to form a consensus, but also to ﬁnd the truth.
Even if clustering does not directly retard scientiﬁc progress, it is in fact a proxy for identifying the
real cause: the small radius of inﬂuence used by the agents in the ﬁeld. Large radius, even in connection
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) 3735.33∗∗∗ 2037.75∗∗∗ 3406.91∗∗∗ 2142.94∗∗∗
(364.17) (176.41) (482.20) (250.77)
Clusters 428.33∗∗∗ −25.31∗ 418.27∗∗∗ −41.39∗∗
(22.37) (9.94) (32.95) (14.13)
R2 0.46 0.01 0.51 0.03







Table 1: Model 1: alpha = [0.01; 0.5; 0.99], and R = 0.03. Model 2: alpha = [0.01; 0.5; 0.99], and R = 0.3.
Model 3: alpha = 0.01, and R = 0.03; Model 4: alpha = 0.01, and R = 0.3;
with low social inﬂuence, do not generally lead to a clustered ﬁeld. The confounding nature of clustering
and social inﬂuence has is such that fragmentation has often been erroneously seen as the primary cause
of the slow rate of progress of disciplines like sociology. Our simulation results clearly show that clustered
ﬁelds can make quick progress if agents are open to social inﬂuence, and use a large enough radius to
combine the results of investigations of others with their own.
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